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Since the middle of the twentieth century, the phenomenon of public apology has 
become increasingly prevalent and visible, enacted in contexts ranging from the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the Australian government’s apology to 
the Stolen Generation, to the iconic genuflection of Willy Brandt before the Warsaw 
Ghetto Monument.  While research surrounding public apology (particularly in the 
context of work on trauma, memory and reconciliation) has also become increasing 
prevalent, literary representations of public apology remain under-researched.  Works 
like J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999) present something of a scholarly conundrum. In the 
final historical and cultural assessment of public apologies, how are imaginative 
representations of apologies to be understood? Do they participate in the apologising 
process, or do they simply describe it?  What implications does a judgement either way 
hold for scholarship on the larger relations between art and civic life? This paper finds a 
way into some of these large questions by considering the specific case of Judith Wright 
and the forms of literary redress she made to Indigenous Australians.1    
  
The apology is one of the forms of communication identified by linguist J.L. Austin as a 
performative gesture or speech act—a phrase which, in being spoken, does not 
constitute utterance alone but performs actions in the real social world.  Austin gives 
the following examples: to utter the phrase ‘I promise’ is to perform the act of 
promising; to say ‘I bequeath’ is to perform the act of bequeathing; and, in a wedding, 
the phrase ‘I do’ is the act which marries the couple (5). Similarly, the act of apology is 
performed through the articulation of the phrase ‘I apologise’. Importantly, in setting 
out his definition of performative speech, Austin explicitly excludes aesthetic works.  He 
argues that if any of the phrases above are spoken, for instance, on stage, they do not 
count as performatives—the audience understands an actor’s promise as an artistic 
representation rather than as a genuine act with genuine consequences.    
  
Austin claims that speech acts ‘do not count’ when uttered in an artistic context. He 
writes: ‘a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if 
said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy … All 
this we are excluding from consideration’ (22). Many theorists and writers, most 
notably Derrida, Hillis Miller, de Gaynesford, Sedgewick and Hill, have challenged 
Austin’s exclusion of literary language from the category of the speech act. It makes 
intuitive sense that if someone is pronouncing a couple married on stage, the two actors 
are not really being married.  The question then becomes:  how to give an account of the 
acts that artistic speech acts do perform? Austin gives the example of the performative 
phrase in a marriage ceremony as an example of a speech act which loses its 
performative force in artistic contexts. This ceremony, however, provides especially 
salient counterexamples to his blanket excision. In a play with a wedding scene, the 
performative phrase marrying the couple may not bind the two actors in real life, but it 
may nonetheless constitute some kind of social intervention, especially if the 
representation is at odds with the political realities of the time and place of 
                                                          
1 Wright makes an explicit prose apology at the end of her memoir titled Half a Lifetime.   
performance (as in a representation of a mixed-race marriage in nineteenth-century 
America, or a same-sex marriage in, for instance, parts of the modern Caribbean).  The 
question then becomes: what does a performative on stage do?  What is the act in an 
artistic speech act? And how is giving an answer to this different from giving a general 
account of the social powers of literature?   
  
More specifically, it is necessary to ask how the literary speech’s act’s status as an echo 
of an actual speech act shapes the nature of its social intervention. The act that a work 
of literature performs on the world is not the same as the speech act designated within 
it: nonetheless, the presence of the speech act within the literary work may shape the 
work’s larger social action in unique ways.  
  
The act of public apology offers a particularly significant test case for work on the 
relationship between performative speech and literary language.  In literary 
representations of public apology, which can involve the same audience and occur at the 
same time as the real apology (and potentially be bound up with its impetus or its 
aftermath), questions surrounding the connection between actual performatives and 
their artistic counterparts become particularly acute. While considerable attention has 
been paid to fictional representations of apology, the equivalent utterances in poetry 
remain underexplored.  The writing around apology by poets like Judith Wright, 
Adrienne Rich and Geoffrey Hill merits substantial examination in this context, as it 
opens up important questions about literary voice and social agency in acts of public 
apology.   
  
The ‘lyric I’ is not the same kind of ‘I’ as a narratorial or dramatic one, and this 
difference inflects the lyric speaker’s relationship to the apology and to the original 
wrong. In scenes of public apology, a gap is often observable between the individual 
responsible for the apology and the individual or individuals responsible for the harm 
(the gap registered in the difference between ‘sorry-for’ and ‘sorry-that’).  This 
mismatch in agency finds a formal parallel in the identity of poetic speakers, even those 
whose utterances have nothing to do with apology.  Like the politician speaking on 
behalf of a national community, the poetic speaker, in accounts both ancient and 
modern of the lyric voice, is frequently figured as speaking on behalf of others. To give 
one example, Hazlitt, as Hugh Haughton has observed, claims poetry ‘puts the individual 
for the species, the one above the infinite many’ (139). Even in the twentieth century, 
poetic speakers are still associated with (indeed, accused of) one-for-many 
representation. Particularly relevant in its colonial echoes is the suggestion by critics Li 
and Saiz (cited by Mark Jeffreys) that poetic speech constitutes no less than the 
‘imperial assertion of self’ (197). Further, the civic authority being claimed when a 
writer takes on the burden of apology manifests itself differently for poets:  the 
particular set of bardic, oracular associations around poetic authority shape the act of 
poetic apology itself and the formation of its audience.   
  
One of the canonical contemporary discussions of vicarious speech and its hazards is 
Linda Alcoff’s anthropological ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’. She writes: ‘a 
speaker's location (which I take here to refer to their social location, or social identity) 
has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims and can serve either to 
authorize or disauthorize one's speech’ (7).  In light of this, she asks, “Is the discursive 
practice of speaking for others ever a valid practice, and, if so, what are the criteria for 
validity?” (7). Vicariousness involves speaking on behalf of others, but the category of 
‘others’ is complicated by Judith Wright’s particular status in the group she represents. 
Wright is guilty by virtue of her membership of a group which has collectively 
committed wrongs, rather than by virtue of committing them herself. A question 
remains in this intergenerational context, however, as to whether the category of the 
wrongdoer can be bounded in this way, or is necessarily more diffuse—whether 
wrongdoers can be separated out from other members of the national group. Certain 
acts have definite responsible agents, but the inheritors of the advantage gained as a 
result of these earlier acts occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the wrong.  As 
Wright suggests, on some level she too is guilty by virtue of inheriting and inhabiting 
property gained through earlier acts of murder and dispossession. If, then, the agency 
attached to this wrong is diffuse rather than individually allocated, then the concept of 
‘speaking for others’ (in vicarious apology and vicarious poetic utterance alike) cannot 
operate in the same way:  there is no clear set of ‘others’.   
  
Judith Wright’s work, then, is especially well placed to shed light on the complex and 
underexamined interrelations of voice, form, agency and responsibility in literary forms 
of public apology. Wright’s poetry disrupts J.L. Austin’s understanding of speech acts, in 
particular, apology, on a number of levels, helping to reveal the need for more nuanced 
accounts of literary performatives. Most obviously, in the absence of an official apology 
to Indigenous Australians before the Rudd years, Wright explicitly offers her own 
apology at the end of Half a Lifetime.  This document uses the formulation proposed by 
Austin, in the sense that she writes in the first person present indicative, and uses the 
words characteristically associated with this speech act (‘I say sorry’, ‘I plead 
forgiveness’):    
  
To all the peoples of the old and true Australia on whose land I have trespassed 
and whom, by being part of my own people, I have wronged, I plead forgiveness. 
To all of them I owe that overweighing debt of life itself, and to all of them I now 
bend my head and say Sorry.  Sorry, above all, that I can make nothing right 
(296).  
  
Wright is here disrupting Austin’s categories already in that the literary form in which 
she makes this apology is at once artistic and non-artistic (according to Austin’s 
definition which emphasises fictionality rather than aesthetic merit):  a memoir is a 
type of literary writing but at the same time is defined by its element of the non-
fictional.  Further, the audience Wright gains for her apology was earned in part through 
her literary work, raising the question of whether, in this case and more broadly, 
Austin’s artistic/non-artistic division is defined solely by the genre in which the writer 
is working, or by the speaker’s identity as an artistic figure. While some of Wright’s 
most important statements of public apology were made in prose form, it was her civic 
authority as a socially-conscious poet which earned an audience for her ideas.  
  
It is not only this direct statement which gives Wright’s work its relevance for debates 
around literary representations of public apology: much of her poetry is concerned with 
making some kind of amends for the wrongs committed by her ancestors and fellow 
non-Indigenous Australians. The relationship between the explicit statement of apology 
in Half a Lifetime and the broader reparative project of this poetry ultimately helps to 
show how the performative gesture of apology in literature can encompass writing 
which does not conform to the grammatical criteria set out by Austin.  I will argue that 
in the context of Australian indigenous dispossession, in which part of the wrong has 
been silence itself (a lack of apology but also a lack of legal recognition and a lack of 
historical recognition) the gesture of speaking out can in itself constitute a form of 
speech act. By challenging Austin’s definition of performative language, in which 
syntactical and grammatical formulations must be present in order for the speech act to 
‘count’, reading Wright’s work in this way calls into question not only Austin’s exclusion 
of artistic works from his definition of speech acts but also his emphasis on the 
grammatical specificity of their formulation.  
  
This article will conclude by reflecting on a further dimension of importance Wright 
holds for debates about literary incarnations of performative language:  her self-
awareness about the ethical risks entailed in her reparative gestures.  If literary speech 
acts are not, as Austin would have them, denatured reflections but active interventions, 
then the ethical caveats attending them take on new urgencies, urgencies for which 





As has been widely acknowledged, one of the many forms of wrong done to Aboriginal 
people involves language itself—in particular, an absence of language: the lack of 
opportunity for Aboriginal people to be heard, and a lack of adequate acknowledgement 
and discussion by white Australians.  Given this, it is worth asking if and how the 
recounting of injustices done to Aboriginal people constitutes a form of reparative 
gesture in itself, which is different from but lies on a continuum with, the explicit speech 
act of apology. Could narration and truth-telling here function as its own form of 
performative, in which the gesture of speaking in itself becomes an act, regardless of the 
particularities of the formulation? If, under these circumstances, the very act of 
speaking is positioned as a form of redress, it would help mount a new angle of 
challenge to Austin’s emphasis on a strict formulation (first person present indicative) 
in his definition of the speech act.  What Wright’s work ultimately shows is the blurred 
line that distinguishes the category of the speech act and the act of speaking out under 
certain historical circumstances.  
  
Part of the wrong that many of Wright’s poems acknowledge is not only the original and 
ongoing acts of violence and dispossession but also the lack of record and 
acknowledgement.  Many commentators’ responses to Bringing them Home highlight 
the injustice of the silence that preceded it.  As Susan Barrett observes, citing John Frow, 
‘it was the first official report to “give a voice to those who have not been listened to, or 
who have had the language in which to tell a story taken away from them”’ (2).  As Kay 
Schaffer argues in ‘Narrative Lives and Human Rights: Stolen Generation Narratives and 
the Ethics of Recognition’;  
  
Some of the most painful passages for many readers of Bringing them Home 
were those in which narrators testified to being abused, and then shamed, when 
they tried to tell their stories to officials who rebuked them. Not being heard is 
part of the process by which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have 
been erased and effaced in the nation’s history (9)  
  
Wright acknowledges this lack of recognition in her own consciousness when she writes 
to Odgeroo Noonucul:  ‘late I began to know / they hadn't told me the land I loved / was 
taken out of your hands’ (Collected 318). Language becomes all the more important 
when it is recognised that the wrongs for which Wright is helping to apologise were, in 
part, verbal ones: failed or unattempted treaties, historical narratives’ blind spots.   
  
Wright explicitly positions her books as a contribution to reparations for the wrong of 
silence. Born of the Conquerors is characterised by a consistent burring indignation 
about the ‘suppression of the real story of the great pastoral invasions of inland 
Australia’ (ix).  After describing early efforts to advance a treaty, she describes the book 
as ‘a further token of that promise’ that ‘we would do individually what we could to 
keep the issue [of a treaty and broader acknowledgement at large] alive’ (Conquerors 
xii).  In We Call for a Treaty, as elsewhere, she places explicit emphasis on the lack of 
historical discussion about displacement:  ‘The story of the overrunning of the 
continent, without any attempt at compensation, agreement or even bargaining by the 
landtakers, was hushed by most early historians’ (2).  We Call for a Treaty shows how 
speech has always been a battleground for, rather than simply the report of, Indigenous 
rights.  Accordingly, whenever We Call for a Treaty describes gains made, the language 
used on the official documents is quoted in careful detail, as, for instance, in her 
description of the Gurindju lease handover in 1972:  Prime Minister Whitlam handed 
them their deeds, saying ‘these lands belong to the Gurindji people and … we restore 
them to you and your children forever’ (Wright, Treaty, 22).   
  
‘Nigger’s Leap, New England’ (Collected 15) is one of the key poems reflecting this 
interest in restorative truth-telling. Given that the wrong constituted in part a lack of 
record, the poem’s act of telling the stories forms part of her effort to make amends, an 
effort which lies on a continuum with her larger project of public apology. The wrong 
recorded in the poem involves both the massacre itself and the fact that it was covered 
up and ignored:  ‘Did we not know their blood channelled our rivers / and the black 
dust our crops ate was their dust?’ (lines 16-7). The lack of knowledge to which the 
poem refers encompasses not only the facts of the mass murders committed at this 
landmark, but a moral and emotional acknowledgement of the tragedy’s depth, which 
would entail a recognition of common humanity and its attendant profound guilt:  ‘we 
should have known / the night that tidied up the cliffs and hid them / had the same 
question on its tongue for us’ (lines 18-20).   
  
In this and other poems, silence-breaking takes places through representations of 
natural phenomena which are figured as witnesses, silent storehouses of testimony 
which the poet helps to make speak. Wright’s poems consistently cast forensic light on 
the landscape, peeling back the surface layers of the earth in order to show the past acts 
they concealed and preserved.  For instance, after describing a bullock driver’s habitual 
routines and specific moments, the ‘Bullocky’ (Collected 17) opens out on the present, in 
which the signs of the past are buried:    
  
Grass is across the wagon-tracks,  
and plough strikes bone beneath the grass,  
and vineyards cover all the slopes  
where the dead teams were used to pass. (Lines 21-4)  
  
In ‘At Cooloola’ (Collected 140-1), she counterpoises the surface level of the present 
with the historical memory underneath:  ‘walking on clean sand among the prints / of 
bird and animal, I am challenged by a driftwood spear / thrust from the water (line 21-
3). The imagined spear preserved in the water echoes the description in ‘Bora Ring:’ 
(Collected 8) ‘the hunter is gone; the spear is splintered underground’ (line 9).  ’At 
Cooloola’ equates the earth with an historical record most explicitly in its description of 
the ghost of a ‘warrior armed for fighting, / who sank into bare plain, as now into time 
past’ (line 15-6). In several of the poems, this uncovering of the strata of history 
recorded in the land expressly emphasise that dispossession was a condition for the 
growing of European crops which fed the invading population. This awareness 
manifests itself in the grim irony of the ending to ‘Bullocky’, with its ironic reflection on 
religious entitlement:  ‘The prophet Moses feeds the grape, / and fruitful in the 
Promised Land’ (lines 27-8). In ‘Nigger’s Leap, New England’, this is figured as especially 
obscene: ‘the black dust our crops ate was their dust’ (line 17).  
  
‘Nigger’s Leap, New England’, is particularly clear in its casting natural elements as 
witnesses which hid horror and preserved it for belated acknowledgement. By 
emphasising this process of concealment via the extended metaphor of the night, the 
poem presents the land as a silent arbiter of justice, and her own poetic speech as an act 
of silence-breaking. The night, in particular, is presented as covering up but also storing 
up the memory of the killings, and standing as a reproach:  ‘the night that tidied up the 
cliffs and hid them / had the same question on its tongue for us’ (lines 19-
20).  Specifically, the night is repeatedly represented as an ocean which, in harbouring 
the guilt of the past, becomes treacherous in the present:  ‘night runs an obscure tide 
round cape and bay’ (line 2); ‘night buoys no warning / over the rocks that wait our 
keels; no bells / sound for the mariners’ (lines 10-2); ‘night floods us suddenly as 
history / that has sunk many islands in its good time’ (lines 25-6).  
  
The poem at once writes about the menace of the night in the third person and 
addresses itself to it, bidding this covering movement to offer belated protection and 
comfort to the victims as well as reproach to the perpetrators— ‘swallow the spine of 
range; be dark. O lonely air.  / Make a cold quilt across the bone and skull / that 
screamed …’ (lines 5-7).  In this phrase in particular, part of the poem’s uncovering 
involves seeing, retrospectively, physical bodies in the landscape’s own formations 
where before the presence of the dead was ignored—the poem refers to ‘the spine of 
range’ (line 5) and the ‘lipped cliff’ (line 7), and even uses this body part as a verb: ‘night 
lips the harsh / scarp’ (line 24-5).  These descriptions form a kind of readout of the 
landscape which has stored up and concealed the country’s horrific past. To what extent 
might the very act of speaking out in the context of such concealment constitute its own 
form of speech act? Austin famously and controversially ties his definition of the speech 
act to specific formulations, but what poems like these help to suggest is that the line 
between the specific speech act of apology and a poet’s broader apologetic project may 
not be so distinct.   
  
Haig Khatchadourian’s analysis of how silences affect meaning is especially relevant to 
this view of silence-breaking as a form of performative. Khatchadourian proposes that 
‘silence, like speech and action, “initiated” by a human being, whether by being silent, 
becoming silent, or breaking silence is frequently if not always significant or meaningful 
in some sense’ (9). Similarly, bell hooks argues that silence-breaking constitutes an act 
in the context of historical oppression:    
  
Moving from silence into speech is for the oppressed, the colonized, the 
exploited, and those who stand and struggle side by side a gesture of defiance 
that heals, that makes new life and new growth possible. It is that act of speech, 
of “talking back,” that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the expression 
of our movement from object to subject—the liberated voice (9)  
  
In this context of a liberatory politics, the conception of silence-breaking as an act is 
well established, but this is not quite the same as seeing silence-breaking’s status as an 
act as deriving in part from its status as a speech act (before its status as a literary 
speech act is even considered). Dennis Curzon, in his Discourses of Silence, has made the 
suggestion that silence can in particular cases constitute a speech act, basing himself in 
part of Searle’s criteria of intention (25). As in Searle’s account of indirect speech acts, 
Wright’s speech acts of silence-breaking are defined more by context than by 
constitutive grammar. Reflecting on the performative status of silence-breaking not only 
helps to challenge Austin’s definition which binds grammar with context: it also sheds 
light on this chapter’s central conundrum: the continuities between Wright’s direct form 
of public apology at the end of Half a Lifetime and the cognate gestures of reparation she 
makes in many of the poems.  In order to understand the performative force of Wright’s 
prose apology, it is necessary to ask how it is shaped by those earlier poems which 
acknowledge wrongs, as the prose apology would have much less force without them. 
Ultimately, if in the context of a lack of acknowledgement, the very gesture of speaking 
out might become a speech act in itself, what is the relationship between the speech act 
of apologetic silence-breaking and Half a Lifetime’s explicit act of apology?  
  
Alexis Wright, Kay Schaffer and Susan Barrett offer useful insights into the importance 
of the form of silence-breaking speech.  Barrett argues that there are risks which attend 
those forms of speaking out which distil personal stories into a collective narrative: ‘it 
ignores the experiences of individuals, something which Bringing them Home had 
established as both desirable and necessary’ (7). However, as Barrett has suggested, the 
play of individual empathy in ‘micro-history as opposed to macro-history’ holds ethical 
dangers of its own:  ‘the story of an individual is undoubtedly an excellent way of 
arousing white interest in the country’s shameful past. At the same time, too much 
empathy can lead to a blurring of the realities of the historical situation and a failure to 
see the political implications of the subject’s story … ’ (11). Schaffer argues that this 
‘empathetic identification’ ‘enacts an imagined participation in the suffering of others, 
what Dominic La Capra calls a “surrogate victimage” (La Capra 182) that engages the 
listener’s feelings in ways that might actually short circuit the distance required for the 
respondent to register the legitimate claims of the other’ (12). Presenting these 
individual stories in fictional form, Susan Barrett argues, becomes especially valuable 
and important in this context, as it introduces a ‘a third person narrative voice’ (9), and 
‘these shifts in point of view remove the dangers of unconditional empathy and 
identification with one single character and force the reader to reflect on the question of 
responsibility and where the blame really lies’ (10). Judith Wright’s poetry, I hope to 





Wright’s poetry is such a fertile source for discussions of performative language in 
poetry (and apology in particular) in part because she is especially self-aware about the 
ethical compromises her endeavour entails. She doesn’t so much show how speech acts 
like public apology might fail when they are uttered in the context of a literary work: 
rather, she suggests that they risk being dangerously successful, that literature can be a 
space for making reparative gestures but that this process has its own morally 
questionable dimensions. In Wright’s case, then, the question becomes: to what extent 
are the moral hazards inherent in the process of apologising specific to poetic apologies? 
Are there risks, for her, in the very process of expressing guilt, and then further forms of 
risk associated with the specific kinds of artifice in poetic apologies?    
  
The multiple associations of the words ‘guilty’ and ‘righteous’, two recurring words in 
Wright, are especially significant in this context.  Both these terms can designate a state 
of being and an emotion at once: indeed, the lack of a connection between state and 
emotion lies at the core of the problem. Not all of those who are guilty feel guilt, and 
conversely, not all of those who feel righteous are righteous in their acts. The phrase 
‘oppressed by arrogant guilt’ (line 20) from ‘At Cooloola’ suggests both the actions that 
were enabled by the arrogance of her ancestors and concomitantly the guilt that arises 
from it.  The phrase ‘arrogant guilt’, however, also acknowledges the dimension of 
hubris potentially involved in guilt itself —including, perhaps, Wright’s own literary 
expression of it.  As she says wryly in ‘Two Dreamtimes’ (Collected 318), a poem very 
much about wanting to make amends and knowing the words to be insufficient, ‘trust 
none – not even poets’ (line 84).  
  
At various points in her poems dealing with historical guilt there is a suggestion that the 
very language she uses to describe the land carries its own dimension of cultural 
dislocation. The opening of ‘At Cooloola’ juxtaposes her foreign ways of understanding 
land against an ancient bird’s ways of interacting with it:  
   
The blue crane fishing in Cooloola’s twilight  
Has fished there longer than our centuries.  
He is the certain heir of lake and evening,  
And he will wear their colour till he dies,  
  
But I’m a stranger, come of a conquering people.  
I cannot share his calm, who watch his lake,  
Being unloved by all my eyes delight in,  
And made uneasy, for an old murderer’s sake.(Lines 1-8)  
  
When she describes her own feeling of unease in the land she loves in ‘At Cooloola’, the 
prosodic features of the poem are key to the poem’s communication of the lack of fit she 
feels in the landscape.  The first two lines of the stanza register the inappropriateness of 
human divisions of time:  ‘the blue crane fishing in Cooloola’s twilight has fished there 
longer than our centuries’.  The stress patterns in the lines put the emphasis on the 
word ‘our’—the pronouns that stresses the relative, subjective status of these human 
thought structures. While the first half of the line sets up a strong iambic pattern (‘has 
fished there longer’) which would lead the ‘our’ to be unstressed, especially given the 
strong stress at the start of ‘centuries’.  However, it would be quite unnatural to 
stress ‘than’ in these circumstances, which means that the word ‘your’ ends up 
receiving if not all, at least some of the emphasis.   
  
The inappropriateness of human categories is registered in the third line’s disjunct 
between the societal notion of the ‘heir’ and the bird’s way of belonging to the 
landscape. The phrase ‘certain heir’ crystallises this ambivalence. It describes the 
certainty felt by a human observer about the crane, functioning as a transferred epithet, 
but the phrase also presents this certainty as the crane’s own, suggesting perhaps that it 
has a dimension of certainty to its manner, befitting the landscape’s natural ‘heir’.  This 
line is a rich manifestation of the poem’s central problem because it both disavows and 
manifests the imposition of human ways of understanding onto nature.  These moments 
in which Wright acknowledges her own lack of right to the land, which form part of her 
larger project of apology and amends making, are self-abnegating and point to their 
own limits, and they are especially ambivalent because they achieve this self-
undermining by leaning on the prosodic structures of introduced poetic traditions.  
  
In ‘At Cooloola’, this prosodic manifestation of the English imposition become clearest 
when the poetic speaker is herself introduced. The introduction of the speaker herself is 
jarring in part because it, even grammatically, feels like an unnecessary addition.  The 
first stanza sounds very complete on its own until the awkward last comma which then 
leads into the next stanza’s ‘but I’m’. The first two lines form a sentence with a full stop 
at the end of the second line, and in the other half of the stanza, and end of the second 
two lines, the thought is similarly complete, setting up the same expectation of closure: 
‘He is the certain heir of lake and evening, and he will wear their colour till he dies.’  The 
sense of completion is solidified by the eye-rhyme between ‘centuries’ and ‘dies’ and by 
the relatively stable metrical pattern in the stanza (an 11 syllable line of loose but 
recognisable iambic pentameter with an additional unstressed syllable is followed by a 
similarly loose 10 syllable lines of iambic pentameter). Together they create a sense that 
the line has finished on ‘dies’.  This means that the comma at the end of the line which 
ushers in the speaker’s own persona comes as a surprise, and the line that introduces 
the “I” is a contrast in its unprecedented length and irregularity.  Indeed, throughout the 
poem’s descriptions of Wright’s own uneasy place, there is a concomitant instability in 
the rhythm. The eighth line, similarly, describing this unease explicitly, ends with a 
phrase which feels unstably excessive with its three unstressed syllables in row and its 
longer length:  ‘and made uneasy, for an old murderer’s sake’.  
  
As this example from ‘At Cooloola’ helps to show, then, Wright registers her 
ambivalence about her own project of poetic atonement in and through her deployment 
of the specific resources of English prosody.  In raising both the possibility of specifically 
poetic speech acts— specifically the act of apology and atonement, but acknowledging 
the moral limits of this project, she offers a particularly valuable point of reference in 
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